WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 2 circulated to Members of the World Trade Organization (the "WTO") on 17 May 1999. In paragraph 8.1 of its Report, the Panel concluded that Canada: (a) through Special Milk Classes 5(d) and (e) -and this for all of the dairy products in dispute (butter, cheese and "other milk products") and for both marketing years at issue (1995/1996 and 1996/1997) -has acted inconsistently with its obligations under Article 3.3 and Article 8 of the Agreement on Agriculture by providing export subsidies as listed in Article 9.1(a) and Article 9.1(c) of that Agreement in excess of the quantity commitment levels specified in Canada's Schedule; and (b) by restricting the access to the tariff-rate quota for fluid milk to (i) consumer packaged milk for personal use and (ii) entries valued at less than C$20, acts inconsistently with its obligations under Article II:1(b) of GATT 1994.
3.
In paragraph 8.3 of its Report, the Panel made the following recommendation:
We recommend that the Dispute Settlement Body requests Canada: (i) to bring its dairy products marketing regime into conformity with its obligations in respect of export subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture; and (ii) to bring its tariff-rate quota for fluid milk into conformity with GATT 1994. 
5.
The oral hearing in the appeal was held on 6 September 1999. 6 The participants presented oral arguments and responded to questions put to them by the Members of the Appellate Body Division hearing the appeal. 4 Pursuant to Rule 21(1) of the Working Procedures. 5 Pursuant to Rule 22(1) of the Working Procedures. 6 Pursuant to Rule 27 of the Working Procedures.
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II. Background
A.
The Canadian Dairy Regime

6.
The relevant factual and regulatory aspects concerning the Canadian dairy regime, including the Special Milk Classes Scheme, are fully described in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.66 of the Panel Report.
For the purposes of this appeal, we summarize certain of the principal aspects of the Panel's factual findings.
Institutions
7.
Regulatory jurisdiction over trade in dairy products in Canada is divided between the federal and the provincial governments. 7 The Canadian federal government has the power to regulate interprovincial and international trade generally, including trade in milk, while the provincial governments have jurisdiction over aspects of the production and sale of milk within the provinces. 8 Three entities
have decision-making roles with respect to the production and sale of milk in Canada: the Canadian Dairy Commission (the "CDC"), the provincial milk marketing boards and the Canadian Milk Supply Management Committee (the "CMSMC").
(a) CDC
8.
The CDC is a Crown corporation established under the Canadian Dairy Commission Act (the "CDC Act"), a federal statute. 9 The CDC is funded by the Canadian federal government as well as by its market activities and by producers. 10 The chairman, the vice-chairman and the commissioner of the CDC are appointed by the federal government of Canada, and the CDC is accountable to the federal Parliament, reporting to the Minister of Agriculture and Agri-Food.
11
9.
The CDC Act empowers the CDC, inter alia , to establish national target prices for industrial milk 12 ; to buy and sell dairy products, including through importation and exportation; and to operate 7 Panel Report, para. 2.7. 8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., para. 2.12. 10 Ibid., para. 2.14. 11 Ibid.
12 Industrial milk includes all milk utilized in the preparation of processed dairy products , such as butter, cheese, milk powder, ice cream and yoghurt (see Section F of the National Milk Marketing Plan (the "NMMP")).
WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 4 pools for the marketing of milk and cream. 13 As the chair of the CMSMC 14 , the CDC participates both in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Special Class Pooling 15 and in the establishment of the annual national production quota. 16 The CDC also chairs the Advisory Group on Preemptive Surplus Removal (the "Surplus Removal Committee"), which determines when and whether there is surplus milk available for exports.
(b) Provincial Milk Marketing Boards
10.
In each province, a milk marketing board has been established to "[regulate] the production for marketing, or the marketing, in intraprovincial trade of any dairy product." 18 Membership of the provincial milk marketing boards is comprised mostly or exclusively of dairy producers. 19 11.
The provincial milk marketing boards operate within a legal framework established under federal and provincial legislation, and they exercise powers, given by the federal and provincial governments, in respect of the issuance and administration of quotas, the pooling of returns at the provincial level, pricing, record-keeping and reporting, inspection and agreements to cooperate with other provinces and the CDC. 20 Milk producers cannot sell milk without using the provincial milk marketing boards as an intermediary. 21 Orders or regulations issued by the provincial milk marketing boards can be enforced in the Canadian courts.
(c) CMSMC
12.
The CMSMC is a body established under the NMMP , a federal-provincial agreement whose purpose is to regulate the marketing of milk and cream products in Canada. 23 The NMMP is signed by nine of the provincial milk marketing boards, some provincial governments, and the CDC. 24 The WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 5 respective provincial governments and is chaired by the CDC. 25 The Dairy Farmers of Canada, the National Dairy Council and the Consumers Association of Canada also participate in the CMSMC but have no voting rights. 26 13.
The CMSMC oversees the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Special Class Pooling, pursuant to which the Special Milk Classes Scheme is established. 27 The CMSMC sets the annual national production target for industrial milk (known as the national market sharing quota, the national "MSQ"). 28 The CMSMC then allocates the national MSQ among the provinces based on historical production levels. Industrial milk in Canada is subject to a national common classification system, under which the pricing of milk is based on the end use to which the milk is put.
30
The classification system establishes five different "Classes" of milk, the first four of which cover milk used exclusively in the domestic market. 31 The "Special Milk Classes" are the five sub-classes of Class 5 milk. Special
Classes 5(a) to 5(c) cover milk used for the preparation of certain dairy products that are either sold in the domestic market or exported.
32
Special Class 5(d) is for milk used in products exported to "traditional" export markets. 33 Special Class 5(e) is for the removal of surplus milk from the domestic market. 34 Surplus milk may be either milk that is produced within production quota limits ("in-quota milk") or milk that is produced in excess of production quota limits ("over-quota milk").
35
25 Panel Report, para. 2.28. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., para. 2.27. 28 Ibid., para. 2.29. 29 Ibid., paras. 2.29 and 2.31. 30 Ibid., para. 2.38. 31 The Panel describes Classes 1 to 4 of the classification system in paragraph 2.38 of the Panel Report. 32 Panel Report, para. 2.39. 33 Ibid. Further details as to the operation of Special Class 5(d) are given at paragraphs 2.49, 2.51, 2.53 to 2.56, 7.68 and 7.69 of the Panel Report. 34 Ibid. Further details as to the operation of Special Class 5(e) are given at paragraphs 2.49, 2.51, 2.53 to 2.58 and 7.70 to 7.72 of the Panel Report. 35 Further details regarding in-quota and over-quota milk are given at paragraphs 2.40, 2.42 to 2.46 and 2.53 to 2.58 of the Panel Report. are guaranteed a "margin" which "covers the cost of transforming milk … and a return on investment …". Returns to the Producer -Pooling
16.
Returns to producers from the sale of milk are calculated on the basis of a system of pooling.
Two separate pooling mechanisms are used to pool returns from sales of in-quota and over-quota milk. Revenues from all in-quota sales are pooled on a regional basis, whether the milk sold was destined for domestic use or for export.
39
Over-quota sales are subject to a much more limited pooling of returns that covers only over-quota sales. This pooling is conducted on a national basis.
40
B.
Canada's Tariff-Rate Quota for Fluid Milk
17.
The factual aspects relating to Canada's tariff-rate quota for fluid milk are fully provided at paragraphs 7.142 and 7.143 of the Panel Report.
36 Panel Report, para. 2.51. 37 Ibid., para. 7.50. See also para. 2.51, Table 3 , and para. 7.40 of the Panel Report. 38 Ibid., para. 7.59. 39 Further details regarding the pooling mechanism for in-quota milk are given at paragraphs 2.59 to 2.63 and 7.107 to 7.111 of the Panel Report. 40 Further details regarding the pooling mechanism for over-quota milk are given at paragraph 7.112 of the Panel Report. Panel erred by failing to do this. In Canada's view, a subsidy is "direct" if: it is funded directly from government funds; it is paid directly to the beneficiary by the government itself; and it does not involve the activities of non-governmental actors acting through a government-mandated scheme. In this case, since the alleged subsidy is not funded by government, it is not "direct".
20.
The Panel also erred by "equating 'payments-in-kind' with 'direct subsidies'".
41
A subsidy may take the form of a "payment-in-kind", but a "payment-in-kind" is not necessarily a "subsidy". By collapsing these separate legal concepts, the Panel failed to address the two fundamental elements of Article 9.1(a): namely, the terms "direct" and "subs idies".
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21.
Canada contends that the Panel also substituted for the ordinary meaning of "payments", in the term "payments-in-kind", a special meaning of "gratuitous act, a bounty or benefit". 42 The end result is that the Panel equates "payments-in-kind" with "direct subsidies", and "payments", in "payments-in-kind", with "benefit". In so doing, the Panel has confused the form of a transaction ("payments-in-kind") with its economic consequences ("benefit").
22.
Moreover, by holding that the "provision of a good at a price lower than the normal price" 43 was a "payment-in-kind", the Panel departed from the ordinary meaning of that term, which Canada sees as reflecting a requirement to show a "financial contribution". When goods are sold at less than the "normal" price, purchasers are not receiving payments-in-kind but are simply paying less for the goods they receive.
23.
Although the Panel correctly set out to establish the existence of a "benefit", it misconstrued and misapplied that concept. The Panel established two "benchmarks" to test whether a benefit was conferred. 44 Canada submits that the Panel erred in relying on the domestic price of milk as the first benchmark since that price is influenced by lawful, bound tariffs. On the basis of the Panel's approach, the exportation of any product, subject to an import tariff, at the prevailing world market price is, effectively, an export subsidy. It is, however, normal commercial practice for domestic and export prices to be different. Indeed, several provisions of WTO law suggest that price differentiation on the basis of market realities is acceptable.
24.
Canada notes that the Panel's "benefit" test is based on whether processors obtain milk under Special Classes 5(d) and 5(e) at a price more advantageous than the prevailing world market price for competing products, whether or not processors choose to source the product from those markets. The Panel's approach overlooks the commercial reasons why certain access opportunities are not pursued.
The Panel was also wrong to presume that there is a "world market" price for raw milk, since raw milk is rarely traded internationally.
25.
Canada states that the legal error committed in connection with the second benchmark was compounded: by a failure to take into account relevant factual considerations and by making unwarranted presumptions concerning the import of milk under the Import for Re-export Program; by engaging in unwarranted speculation about the commercial viability of importing fluid milk into Canada from the United States; and, by relying on evidence that was deemed to contain "certain 42 Panel Report, para. 7.44. 43 Ibid., para. 7.45.
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inaccuracies" 45 , without providing a basic rationale under Article 12.7 of the DSU to justify placing reliance on such evidence.
(b) "governments or their agencies"
26.
Canada argues that the Panel erred by finding that the provincial milk marketing boards are government agencies "solely on the basis of one characteristic: the delegation of some governmental authority." 46 The mere fact of delegation of authority from government is not sufficient to conclude that an entity is an agency of government.
27.
Canada notes that, in Article 9.1(a), marketing boards are identified as potential recipients of "direct subsidies". The implication is that a marketing board is distinct from "governments or their agencies". Moreover, if marketing boards are deemed to be "government agencies", the result would be that subsidies are being provided by a government to itself.
28.
According to Canada, the Panel was misguided in relying on Article XVII of the GATT 1994
to support its conclusion that marketing boards may be government agencies. That provision has no bearing on the status of the marketing boards at issue under Article 9.1(a). Similarly, the Panel's reference to Article XXIV:12 does not advance its reasoning. That provision states that "regional" or "local" authorities are subject to GATT obligations but does not define such authorities.
29.
Canada notes that Item (d) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in Annex I of the SCM Agreement (the "Illustrative List"), distinguishes between the provision of subsidies by "government-mandated schemes" and by "governments or their agencies". "Government-mandated schemes" will usually entail the delegation of authority by government to a private entity. Yet, under 
33.
The Panel also erred by equating a "payment-in-kind" with the provision of a good at a discounted price or "revenue foregone". As regards "revenue foregone", the Panel erred in concluding that, because such revenue counts against a Member's budgetary outlay commitments, every type of subsidy listed in Article 9.1 covers "revenue foregone". In Canada's view, it is only if the specific sub-paragraph of Article 9.1 can be interpreted to i nclude "revenue foregone" that such revenue is relevant to the subsidy concerned. The Panel also fails to differentiate between "payments-in-kind"
and "revenue foregone". In effect, therefore, the Panel errs by collapsing the separate terms, "payments", "payments-in-kind" and "revenue foregone", into a single concept. 
35.
Canada also points to what it considers to be significant differences between in-quota and over-quota milk as regards the degree of government involvement and contends that the Panel erred by dismissing these differences. 47 Neither the boards nor the CDC determine how much over-quota 47 The factors regarding in-quota and over-quota milk that Canada identified are mentioned by the Panel in paragraphs 7.83 and 7.99 of the Panel Report.
WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 11 milk will actually be produced. Canada also underlines the differences in the pooling of returns to producers as between in-quota and over-quota milk. Agreement could be applied in isolation, since only by applying the Agreements together could consistency be ensured.
44.
Canada seems to argue that the Panel erred because it found that any "payment-in-kind" constitutes a "direct subsidy". New Zealand does not concur in this reading of the Panel Report. The
Panel makes it clear that a "payment-in-kind" is capable of being a "direct subsidy", provided that it can be shown to confer a "benefit". Canada's interpretation would also mean that the word "provision" should be understood as being preceded by the word "direct". In New Zealand's opinion, a "direct subsidy" is one that affects trade directly rather than indirectly. 
54.
According to New Zealand, Canada's argument regarding revenue foregone suggests that such revenue would be excluded from the assessment of budgetary outlay commitments made for "export subsidies" under Article 9.1, unless there is explicit reference to revenue foregone in a particular sub-paragraph of Article 9.1. Since none of the sub-paragraphs in Article 9.1 refers specifically to revenue foregone, the implication of the Canadian argument is that revenue foregone need not be included at all in the calculation of "budgetary outlay" commitments. This is a rewriting of Articles 1(c), 9.1 and 9.2(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture.
(b) "financed by virtue of governmental action" 55. New Zealand submits that, for the reasons given in its arguments on the meaning of "governments or their agencies", the Panel's analysis under Article 9.1(c), insofar as it is based on its analysis under Article 9.1(a), is correct. Canada is attempting to reargue the facts of the case by focusing on differences between in-quota and over-quota milk that the Panel did not regard as significant. The important point is that "governmental action" is involved regardless of whether the milk is in-quota or over-quota. and 5(e) provide a "payment-in-kind" to dairy processors and, second, that the "payment-in-kind" is a "direct subsidy" provided by the Canadian federal and provincial governments, working through the provincial milk marketing boards.
59.
Canada argues that the provision of goods at a price lower than their value is not a "paymentin-kind", although the provision of goods free of charge is. However, this position would allow circumvention of Article 9.1(a) by the imposition of a minimal fee, regardless of how small, for the goods.
60.
The United States agrees with Canada that the SCM Agreement is relevant to the interpretation of the Agreement on Agriculture, but its provisions are not to be given more weight than those of the Agreement on Agriculture. A practice which falls within Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture is an "export subsidy" for the purposes of that Agreement, irrespective of whether the practice is also an "export subsidy" under the SCM Agreement.
WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 16 61. The United States does not consider that the Panel "equated" "payments-in-kind" with "subsidies". First, the Panel focused on the circumstances of this case by referring to the "instant matter". 50 Furthermore, the Panel's finding under Article 9.1(a) is not dependent solely on the term "payments-in-kind", but was an application of the provision in its entirety. The Panel's analysis of whether the "payment-in-kind" conferred a "benefit" is part of the Panel's consideration of the subsidy issue under Article 9.1(a) as a whole.
62.
Canada's argument as to the meaning of "direct" is also flawed. The term "direct" reveals nothing about either the grantor of a subsidy or the source of the funds. Indeed, Canada's own Special Import Measures Act (SIMA) Handbook relies on a very different understanding of the word "direct".
It states that "a direct . . . benefit is one which accrues directly to the person, firm, or industry which is the intended recipient". This is in contrast to "an indirect benefit . . . which does not accrue directly, but which alters the economic environment within which firms operate." Instead, the Panel also considered the functions of the boards, as well as the extent to which the provincial and federal governments retain supervisory oversight over the boards.
66.
The ordinary meaning of the word "agency" is not restricted to a department or other section of the government itself but also embraces entities acting on an agency basis. This meaning clearly does not exclude private entities acting for the government.
67.
The United States disagrees with Canada that the reference in Article 9.1(a) to "marketing boards" as potential recipients of "direct subsidies" precludes "marketing boards" from being WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 17 government agencies in appropriate circumstances. This interpretation is not justified by the text of Article 9.1.
68.
Finally, Canada's argument on Item (d) of the Illustrative List is based entirely on the assumption that "government-mandated schemes" always involve the delegation of governmental authority. The United States does not agree with this assumption.
2. Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture (a) "payments"
69.
Contrary to Canada's arguments, the Panel did not equate "payment" with "payment-in-kind".
The Panel correctly found that "payments-in-kind" represent a subset of the broader term "payment".
Canada, however, treats the two terms as mutually exclusive. This position is untenable given the ordinary definition of "payment" as the "remuneration of a person with money or its equivalent". Canada is also incorrect to suppose that "payments-in-kind" are only included in the scope of the Agreement on Agriculture where express provision is made to that effect. To the contrary, the express reference to "payments-in-kind" is necessary to prevent the terms "direct subsidy" (in Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture) and "direct payment" (in Paragraph 5 of Annex 2 of that Agreement) from being interpreted narrowly to exclude "payments-in-kind".
71.
According to the United States, the Panel was correct to find that the word "payment" in Article 9.1(c) includes "revenue foregone". The drafters did not qualify the word "payment" in Article 9.1(c) in any way. Consistently with its ordinary meaning, the word covers transfers of value to another person or entity. Such a transfer occurs when one party foregoes revenue for the advantage or benefit of another. The fact that the Panel found that the word "payment" encompassed both "payments-in-kind" and "revenue foregone" does not mean, as Canada argues, that these terms are synonymous. 
74.
The United States considers that, for all relevant purposes, the role of the Canadian governments and of the provincial milk marketing boards under Special Classes 5(d) and 5(e) is the same. It makes no difference from the perspective of the processors whether the milk they receive is in-quota or over-quota because the price to them is the same. The United States rejects Canada's argument that it is significant that producers decide themselves whether to produce over-quota milk.
If mandating the production of milk were a prerequisite for a finding of a subsidy, the subsidies disciplines would be altogether eviscerated. 
79.
The United States disagrees with Canada that the most relevant meaning of the word "term" is "limiting conditions", as this meaning would render the word "conditions", in the phrase "terms and conditions", entirely superfluous. It is reasonable to assume that the words "other terms and conditions" contained in Canada's Schedule are intended to mirror the language used in Article II:1(b). The similar language in this provision has been interpreted as indicating not simply additional conditions. 52 Accordingly, there is no reason for giving the entry a narrower interpretation than is justified by the ordinary meaning of its wording.
80.
According to the United States, the only operative word in Canada's notation is the word "represents". However, that word gives the notation no legally operative effect. It is not the same as saying "access is limited to", or "this quantity is available only for", language which Canada could have added, as it did with respect to yoghurt and ice cream.
81.
The United States agrees with the Panel's interpretation of the word "consumer". 53 The Panel was not required to spell out that "consumer" also embraces entities such as processors that "consume" milk in manufacturing. The Panel did not ignore the core issue, but found that the notation did not support the two restrictions imposed by Canada. WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 21 SCM Agreement." 57 On the basis of this interpretive framework, the Panel examined whether Special
Classes 5(d) and 5(e) provide a "benefit". It reached the conclusion that a "benefit" was conferred and that there was, therefore, a "payment-in-kind". 58 On the grounds that this "payment-in-kind" was provided by Canada's "governments or their agencies", the Panel found that "the making available of milk under Classes 5(d) and (e) constitutes an export subsidy within the meaning of Article 9.1(a)." 59 85. Canada submits that the Panel's interpretive approach is flawed. It believes that the Panel has equated "payments-in-kind" with "direct subsidies", and "payments", as used in "payments-in-kind", with "benefit". Thus, in Canada's view, the Panel, in essence, equated "direct subsidies" with "benefit".
86.
On our reading of the Panel Report, the Panel took the view that if "payments-in-kind" were provided by "governments or their agencies", "direct subsidies" were also provided. In other words, the Panel found that a "payment-in-kind" is necessarily a "direct subsidy". This is clear from the Panel's statement that "a determination … that 'payments-in-kind' exist would also be a determination of the existence of a direct subsidy." 60 Moreover, this understanding of the Panel's reasoning is borne out by the Panel's subsequent analysis. At no point did the Panel examine whether the "payments-inkind" that it found to exist were "subsidies", let alone "direct subsidies". To the contrary, the Panel's finding under Article 9.1(a) resulted from its conclus ion that the provision of reduced priced milk to processors for export under Special Classes 5(d) and (e) constitutes "payments-in-kind" provided by Canada's "governments or their agencies".
61
In making this finding, the Panel did not make any reference to the measures being "direct subsidies". It assumed that because the measures were "payments-in-kind" they were, therefore, also "direct subsidies".
87.
In our view, the term "payments-in-kind" describes one of the forms in which "direct subsidies" may be granted. Thus, Article 9.1(a) applies to "direct subsidies", including "direct subsidies" granted in the form of "payments-in-kind". We believe that, in its ordinary meaning, the word "payments", in the term "payments-in-kind", denotes a transfer of economic resources, in a form other than money, from the grantor of the payment to the recipient. However, the fact that a "payment-in-kind" has been made provides no indication as to the economic value of the transfer effected, either from the perspective of the grantor of the payment or from that of the recipient. A 57 Panel Report, para. 7.44. 58 Ibid., paras. 7.58 and 7.62. 59 Ibid., para. 7.87. 60 Ibid., para. 7.43.
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"payment-in-kind" may be made in exchange for full or partial consideration or it may be made gratuitously. Correspondingly, a "subsidy" involves a transfer of economic resources from the grantor to the recipient for less than full consideration. As we said in our Report in Canada -Aircraft, a "subsidy", within the meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement, arises where the grantor makes a "financial contribution" which confers a "benefit" on the recipient, as compared with what would have been otherwise available to the recipient in the marketplace. 62 Where the recipient gives full consideration in return for a "payment-in-kind" there can be no "subsidy", for the recipient is paying market-rates for what it receives. It follows, in our view, that the mere fact that a "payment-in-kind" has been made does not, by itself , imply that a "subsidy", "direct" or otherwise, has been granted.
88.
We, therefore, conclude that the Panel erred in finding that "a determination in the instant matter that 'payments-in-kind' exist would also be a determination of the existence of a direct subsidy." 63 The Panel should have considered whether the particular "payment-in-kind" that it found existed was a "direct subsidy". Instead, because the Panel assumed that a "payment-in-kind" is necessarily a "direct subsidy", it did not address specifically either the meaning of the term "direct subsidies" or the question whether the provision of milk to processors for export under Special
Classes 5(d) and 5(e) constitutes "direct subsidies".
89.
We have just found that the term "payments-in-kind" describes a transfer of economic resources, in a form other than money, but that the term gives no indication as to the economic value of that transfer or as to whether there is a subsidy. 64 The Panel, however, interpreted the word "payments", in the term "payments-in-kind", as connoting "a gratuitous act, a bounty or benefit".
65
(emphasis added) To us, each of these meanings describes the economic value of a transfer, both from the perspective of the grantor and of the recipient. These meanings all infer that the economic resources transferred by way of the payment were given in exchange for less than full value and, in the case of a "gratuitous" payment, without any exchange of value at all. While we acknowledge that a "payment" may be made "gratuitously", the ordinary meaning of the word also encompasses a transfer of economic resources made for full or partial consideration. We, therefore, find that the WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 23
90.
We also note that the Panel's reliance on the SCM Agreement in interpreting Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture was not consistent. The concept of "benefit" is an integral part of the definition of "subsidy" in Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. Yet, on the one hand, the Panel used this term, not to assist in defining the term "direct subsidies" in Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement on
Agriculture, but to define the word "payment". However, on the other hand, the Panel failed entirely to make any mention of the other integral aspect of a "subsidy" under Article 1.1 of t he SCM Agreement, namely the need for a "financial contribution". The Panel did not explain why one aspect of the definition of a "subsidy" in the SCM Agreement is relevant in interpreting Article 9.1(a) of the Agreement on Agriculture, while the other is not.
91.
Thus, on our reading of the Panel Report, the Panel equated a "payment-in-kind" with a "direct subsidy", and then equated a "payment-in-kind" with a "benefit". For the Panel, it followed logically from the existence of a "benefit" that a "direct subsidy" also existed. If the "benefit" was provided by "governments or their agencies", it followed, furthermore, that there was an export follows that that finding is itself tainted by the same errors of law. The conferral of a "benefit" does not necessarily constitute a "payment-in-kind", and a "payment-in-kind" is not necessarily a "direct subsidy".
67
Thus, the Panel's assessment that a "benefit", and hence a "payment-in-kind", are provided by "governments or their agencies" does not, in our view, warrant the conclusion that export subsidies are conferred.
92.
We, therefore, reverse the Panel's interpretive approach, in paragraphs 7.43 and 7.44 of its Report, regarding the terms "direct subsidies" and "payments-in-kind". Since the Panel's finding in … established and operate within a legal framework set up by federal and provincial legislation. These boards exercise powers in respect of inter-provincial and external trade delegated to them by the federal government through the CDC, as well as powers delegated to them by provincial authorities. Three of these boards (Alberta, Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan) are, according to Canada, agencies of the provincial government. Orders or regulations issued by the provincial marketing boards can be enforced before the Canadian courts. In most provinces, individual decisions by the boards are subject to appeal to a provincial supervisory board or commission (of which Canada recognizes the governmental nature). 69 (emphasis added)
It was against this factual background that the Panel concluded that:
It is precisely because the boards receive the authority from the governments to regulate certain areas themselves that their actions become governmental. What is important though is that Canadian governments maintain the ultimate control and supervision of most, if not all, of the boards' activities. These governments define, and approve changes to, the boards' mandates and functions. Canada's appeal focuses on the Panel's findings that the provincial milk marketing boards are "government agencies". Canada takes the view that the Panel erred in law in deciding that these 68 Panel Report, para. 7.74. 69 Ibid., para. 7.76. 70 Ibid., para. 7.78. 71 Ibid., para. 7.80. The bodies involved in the CMSMC are set forth in paragraph 7.79 of the Panel Report.
WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 25 boards are "government agencies" "solely on the basis of one characteristic : the delegation of some governmental authority." 72 (emphasis added) 97. We start our interpretive task with the text of Article 9.1(a) and the ordinary meaning of the word "government" itself. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "government" means, inter alia , "[t]he regulation, restraint, supervision, or control which is exercised upon the individua l members of an organized jural society by those invested with authority ". 73 (emphasis added) This is similar to meanings given in other dictionaries. 74 The essence of "government" is, therefore, that it enjoys the effective power to "regulate", "control" or "supervise" individuals, or otherwise "restrain" their conduct, through the exercise of lawful authority. This meaning is derived, in part, from the functions performed by a government and, in part, from the government having the powers and authority to perform those functions. A "government agency" is, in our view, an entity which exercises powers vested in it by a "government" for the purpose of performing functions of a "governmental" character, that is, to "regulate", "restrain", "supervise" or "control" the conduct of private citizens. As with any agency relationship, a "government agency" may enjoy a degree of discretion in the exercise of its functions. 98.
In the present case, the Panel seems to us to have applied precisely these concepts in concluding that the provincial milk marketing boards are "government agencies". Contrary to Canada's assertions, the Panel's conclusion is not based on the sole fact that the provincial milk marketing boards enjoy authority delegated to them by governments. To the contrary, the Panel examined both the source of the provincial boards' powers and the functions performed by those boards in the exercise of their powers. We note, furthermore, that as regards three of the provincial boards, Canada acknowledged that they were "agencies" of certain provincial governments of Canada. 
101.
Moreover, the presence of dairy producers as officers of the provincial boards does not compel a change in our view. Irrespective of the composition of the boards, the source of their powers is still "governments" and the nature of the functions that they exercise is still "governmental".
Nor is our opinion altered by the fact that the provincial boards exercise their powers with a view to promoting the interests of particular traders, namely, the producers. In our view, it is part of the normal functioning of "governments" to promote the perceived interests of the State, and this may involve securing the interests of one or more sectors of the community. 84 Panel Report, para. 7.90. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., para. 7.92.
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107.
We have found that the word "payments", in the term "payments-in-kind" in Article 9.1(a), denotes a transfer of economic resources. 88 We believe that the same holds true for the word "payments" in Article 9.1(c). The question which we now address is whether, under Article 9.1(c), the economic resources that are transferred by way of a "payment" must be in the form of money, or whether the resources transferred may take other forms. As the Panel observed, the dictionary meaning of the word "payment" is not limited to payments made in monetary form. In support of this, the Panel cited the Oxford English Dictionary, which defines "payment" as "the remuneration of a person with money or its equivalent". 89 (emphasis added) Similarly, the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary describes a "payment" as a "sum of money (or other thing) paid". 90 (emphasis added)
Thus, according to these meanings, a "payment" could be made in a form, other than money, that confers value, such as by way of goods or services. A "payment" which does not take the form of money is commonly referred to as a "payment in kind".
108.
We agree with the Panel that the ordinary meaning of the word "payments" in Article 9.1(c) is consistent with the dictionary meaning of the word. Under Article 9.1(c), "payments" are "financed by virtue of governmental action" and they may or may not involve "a charge on the public account".
Neither the word "financed" nor the term "a charge" suggests that the word "payments" should be interpreted to apply solely to money payments. A payment made in the form of goods or services is also "financed" in the same way as a money payment, and, likewise, "a charge on the public account" may arise as a result of a payment, or a legally binding commitment to make payment by way of goods or services, or as a result of revenue foregone.
109.
The context of Article 9.1(c) also supports a reading of the word "payments" that embraces "payments-in-kind". That context includes the other sub-paragraphs of Article 9.1. As the Panel explained, none of the export subsidies listed in Article 9.1 is restricted to grants made solely in money form and several expressly involve subsidies granted in a form other than money. 91 Under Article 9.1(a), "payments-in-kind" are specifically included as a form of "direct subsidies". Similarly, under Articles 9.1(b), the export subsidy identified may involve the disposal of agricultural goods at less than domestic price. Under Article 9.1(e), the provision of transport services for export shipments at prices lower than the price charged for domestic shipments is also an export subsidy. 88 Supra, para. 87. WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 29
Thus, each of these three sub-paragraphs of Article 9.1 specifically contemplates that the export subsidy may be granted in a form other than a money payment.
110.
The context, in our view, also includes Article 1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture. In terms of that provision, "revenue foregone" is to be taken into account in determining whether "budgetary outlay" commitments, made with respect to export subsidies as listed in Article 9.1, have been exceeded. In our view, the foregoing of revenue usually does not involve a monetary payment.
Thus, if a restrictive reading of the words "payments" were adopted, such that "payments" under Article 9.1(c) had to be monetary, no account could be taken, under Article 9.1(c), of "revenue foregone". This would, we believe, prevent a proper assessment of the commitments made by WTO Members under Article 9.2, as envisaged by Article 1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture. We, therefore, prefer a reading of Article 9.1(c) that allows full account to be taken of "revenue foregone".
The contrary view would, in our opinion, elevate form over substance and permit Members to circumvent the subsidy disciplines set forth in Article 9 of the Agreement on Agriculture.
111.
It is true, as Canada argues, that Article 9.1(c) does not expressly include "payments-in-kind" within its scope, whereas Article 9.1(a) and paragraph 5 of Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture do. However, we do not regard the express inclusion of "payments-in-kind" in these two provisions as necessarily implying the exclusion of "payments-in-kind" under Article 9.1(c). In Article 9.1(a) and in paragraph 5 of Annex 2, the term "payments-in-kind" is used in conjunction with the words "direct subsidies" and " direct payments", respectively. We believe that reference i s made to "payments-in-kind" in these two provisions to counter any suggestion that the ordinary meaning of the terms "direct subsidies" and "direct payments" does not include "payments-in-kind". By contrast, since the ordinary meaning of the word "payments" in Article 9.1(c) includes "payments-in-kind", there was no need for "payments-in-kind" to be expressly provided for. Moreover, if "payments-inkind" are included in the qualified concept of "direct payments" under Annex 2, paragraph 5, it would be incongruous to exclude them from the broader concept of "payments" in Article 9.1(c).
112.
We, therefore, agree with the Panel that the ordinary meaning of the word "payments" in Article 9.1(c) encompasses "payments" made in forms other than money, including revenue foregone.
113.
In our view, the provision of milk at discounted prices to processors for export under Special
Classes 5(d) and 5(e) constitutes "payments", in a form other than money, within the meaning of Article 9.1(c). If goods or services are supplied to an enterprise, or a group of enterprises, at reduced rates (that is, at below market-rates), "payments" are, in effect, made to the recipient of the portion of the price that is not charged. Instead of receiving a monetary payment equal to the revenue foregone, WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 30 the recipient is paid in the form of goods or services. But, as far as the recipient is concerned, the economic value of the transfer is precisely the same.
114.
We, therefore, uphold the Panel's finding, in paragraph 7.101 of the Panel Report, that the provision of discounted milk to processors or exporters under Special Classes 5(d) and 5(e) involves "payments" within the meaning of Article 9.1(c) of the Agreement on Agriculture.
B. "Financed by Virtue of Governmental Action"
115.
The Panel noted at the outset of its analysis on this issue that the parties did not contest that:
… payments-in-kind made under Classes 5(d) and (e) do not directly involve a charge on the public account. The cost of selling milk at a reduced price for export is not borne by the government. It is borne by the milk producers … 92 (underlining added)
116. The Panel observed that such "producer-financed payments" can nonetheless be covered by Article 9.1(c), provided they are "financed by virtue of governmental action". 93 The Panel found that the "payments" made under Special Classes 5(d) and 5(e) were financed in this way. 94 In reaching this conclusion, the Panel relied on a number of factors. These included the facts that: the supply of milk under Special Classes 5(d) and 5(e) is managed by "agencies" of the Canadian federal or provincial governments, within the meaning of Article 9.1(a); these "agencies" determine when and what quantity of milk may be processed for export under those Special Classes; they negotiate the sale price of the milk with the processor or exporter; they enable the processor or exporter to take delivery of the milk; they collect the price paid for the milk by the processors or exporters; they determine the rules for the pooling of returns to producers for in-quota milk, as well as the rules for the more limited pooling of returns for over-quota milk; in the implementation of these rules, they determine the effective selling price of milk for the producers; they pay out those returns to producers; and, they monitor and supervise the operation of Special Classes 5(d) and 5(e). 
119.
In assessing whether the Panel erred in finding that the "payments" made under Special
Classes 5(d) and 5(e) are "financed by virtue of governmental action", it is appropriate to look to the "governmental" involvement as whole and not just to the role of the provincial milk marketing boards.
The functioning of the system depends on a complex regulatory web involving the CDC and the CMSMC, acting together with the provincial milk marketing boards. It is, therefore, the "action" of all these bodies together which must be examined.
120.
While the "cost of selling milk at a reduced price for export is not borne by the government" 97 , "governmental action" is, in our view, indispensable to the transfer of resources that takes place as a result of the operation of Special Classes 5(d) and 5(e). The factors relied upon by the Panel, which we have summarized above 98 , demonstrate that at every stage in the supply of milk under Special Classes 5(d) and 5(e), from the determination of the volume and the authorization of the purchase of milk for processing for export, to the calculation of the price of the milk to the processors and the return to the producers, "governmental action" is not simply involved; it is, in fact, 96 Supra, para. 102. 97 Panel Report, para. 7.102. 98 Supra, para. 116.
WT/DS103/AB/R WT/DS113/AB/R Page 32 indispensable to enable the supply of milk to processors for export, and hence the transfer of resources, to take place. In the regulatory framework, "government agencies" stand so completely between the producers of the milk and the processors or the exporters that we have no doubt that the transfer of resources takes place "by virtue of governmental action".
121.
We have already found, in our reasoning under Article 9.1(a), that the fact that the provincial milk marketing boards are composed, in part, of producers and act in their interests, does not alter the "governmental" character of the provincial boards' "actions". 99 Nor does the fact that, under Special
Class 5(e), in-quota returns to producers are pooled very differently from over-quota returns alter our conclusion. The price paid for the milk by the processors is not, in any way, dependent on whether milk is part of in-quota or over-quota production. Moreover, even though the two pooling mechanisms differ in significant respects, they both nevertheless involve "governmental action" that remains an essential aspect of the financing of the "payments" to processors or exporters.
122.
For these reasons, we, therefore, agree with the Panel's findings 100 that the "payments" made The words " [t] his quantity represents the estimated annual …" are, in our view, introducing "terms" related to the quantity of the quotai.e., describing the way the size of the quota was determined -rather than setting out "conditions" as to the kind of imports qualified to enter Canada under this quota. In particular, the ordinary meaning of the word "represent" in this context does not, in our view, call to mind the setting out of specific restrictions or conditions. 107 (emphasis in original)
128.
The Panel went on to state:
Even if the phrase could be said to include restrictions on access to the tariff-rate quota, we do not see how the two conditions at issue in this dispute could be read into this phrase. First, the restriction that only entries valued at less than C$20 qualify for the tariff-rate quota can nowhere be found in Canada's Schedule. Nowhere is any reference made to a maximum value per entry. … [I]n our view, the ordinary meaning of the words "cross-border purchases" by "consumers" in this context does not warrant the conclusion that only consumer packaged milk for personal use can enter under the tariff-rate quota. An imported good, by definition, crosses a border. Also, the dictionary meaning of "consumer" is not restricted to a person buying for personal use in small retail packages. All dictionary definitions of "consumer" referred to by the parties include wider definitions without these restrictions. 108 A Schedule is … an integral part of the GATT 1994 …. . Therefore, the concessions provided for in that schedule are part of the terms of the treaty. As such, the only rules which may be applied in interpreting the meaning of a concession are the general rules of treaty interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention. ... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.
With regard to "the circumstances of [the] conclusion" of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.
115
133.
It is also well to recall that the task of the treaty interpreter is to ascertain and give effect to a legally operative meaning for the terms of the treaty. The applicable fundamental principle of effet utile is that a treaty interpreter is not free to adopt a meaning that would reduce parts of a treaty to redundancy or inutility.
116
134. We start our interpretive task by noting that the language at issue in Canada's Schedule is included under the heading "Other Terms and Conditions". Under Article II:1(b) of the GATT 1994, the market access concessions granted by a Member are " subject to" the "terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in [its] Schedule". (emphasis added) In our view, the ordinary meaning of the phrase "subject to" is that such concessions are without prejudice to and are subordinated to , and are, therefore, qualified by, any "terms, conditions or qualifications" inscribed in a Member's Schedule.
We believe that the relationship between the 64,500 tonnes tariff-rate quota and the "Other Terms and
Conditions" set forth in Canada's Schedule is of this nature. The phrase "terms and conditions" is a composite one which, in its ordinary meaning, denotes the imposition of qualifying restrictions or conditions. A strong presumption arises that the language which is inscribed in a Member's Schedule In interpreting the language in Canada's Schedule, the Panel focused on the verb "represents"
and opined that, because of the use of this verb, the notation was no more than a "description" of the "way the size of the quota was determined". 118 The to the object and purpose of Article II appears to us to beg the very question that the Panel should 117 The United States contends, on the basis of the panel report in United States -Restrictions on Imports of Sugar (supra, footnote 52), that "terms and conditions" may encompass "additional concessions". We take no position as to whether "terms and conditions" may encompass "additional concessions"; but we do, however, note that, even assuming that the United States is correct on this point, an "additional concession" may well embody a qualification to a concession by expanding its scope or adding to it.
118 Panel Report, para. 7.151. 138.
In our view, the language in the notation in Canada's Schedule is not clear on its face.
Indeed, the language is general and ambiguous, and, therefore, requires special care on the part of the treaty interpreter. For this reason, it is appropriate, indeed necessary, in this case, to turn to "supplementary means of interpretation" pursuant to Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. In so doing, we are unable to share the apparent view of the Panel that the meaning of the notation at issue is so clear and self-evident that there was "no need to also examine the historical background against which these terms were negotiated." 121 (emphasis added)
139.
In considering "supplementary means of interpretation", we observe that the "terms and conditions" at issue were incorporated into Canada's Schedule after lengthy negotiations between Canada and the United States, regarding reciprocal market access opportunities for dairy products.
122
Both Canada and the United States agree that those negotiations failed to produce any agreement between them.
123
Our reading of the circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the 141.
The first condition of General Import Permit No. 1 is that the dairy products, including fluid milk, imported into Canada must be for "the personal use of the importer and his household". This condition appears to us to be reflected in the following phrase in the notation in Canada's Schedule:
"cross-border purchases imported by Canadian consumers". General Import Permit No. 1 allows, in the words of the notation, "Canadian consumers" to "import into Canada" fluid milk and other dairy products that they purchase in the United States. These are, therefore, "cross-border purchases" for the "personal use" of Canadian importers. Thus, we see the first condition of General Import Permit
No. 1 as consistent with the notation at issue in Canada's Schedule.
142.
The second condition of General Import Permit No. 1 is that the value of "each importation"
of any "dairy products" not exceed "$20 in value". In this connection, we note that General Import
Permit No. 1 applies to "dairy products" generally, not just to fluid milk. The tariff-rate quota commitment and the accompanying notation in Canada's Schedule, however, apply only to "fluid milk". Moreover, the notation at issue in Canada's Schedule does not place any limit on the value of each importation. To the extent that the second condition of General Import Permit No. 1 is not reflected in the notation at issue, the Canadian measure is not consistent with Canada's commitment on fluid milk set forth in its Schedule. 
